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The Role and Purpose of Ofsted: The Parents' Friend. 23 
24
Inspection has been a feature of the education landscape in England since its 25 inception in 1838 (Maclure, 2000:83) . The creation of Ofsted (The Office for 26
Standards in Education) in 1992 marked a shift in the culture of inspection in 27
England, placing a far greater emphasis on regulation rather than upon its former 28 focus on development and advice. The new regime drew on John Major's Citizens 29 Charter in its stated aim of creating a more transparent inspection regime, through a 30 with other public service organisations; increasing levels of independence have 23 concomitantly been accompanied by increasing regulatory control (see Clarke, 2013 ) 24 This paradoxical situation is well articulated by Clarke who identifies it as one of four 25 'performance paradoxes', which emerge as regulatory bodies strive to represent the 26 public interest in an increasingly complex system (Clarke, 2008:125) . One such 27 paradox, is what he terms, 'the paradox of independence:' the extent to which the 28 regulatory body can be said to be impartial, as Ofsted describe it,'to inspect without 29 fear or favour.' (Ofsted, 2012g) . 30 Ofsted, has, since its inception been closely associated with a series of 'rational, 31 highly engineered frameworks, that reflect the neo-liberal project (Author & 32 Segerholm, forthcoming).Internationally, inspectorates have become increasingly 33 central to government policy development, acting as both inspectors of practice and 1 regulators of that practice . The English 2 inspectorate has since its inception been located between public and profession, 3 parliament and practitioner. Its power to both inform and form policy through a 4 diachronic discourse of changing notions of excellence and its converse, in 5 education (See for further discussion . As part of the wider 6 audit society (Power, 1997) ,Ofsted as an inspectorate of education, is central to the 7 three overlapping programmes that Power argues have driven the audit explosion: 8 'New Public Management; 'responsive regulation; and quality assurance,'(Ibid:66). By 9 functioning as an ostensibly depoliticised body: 'one of the range of tools, 10 mechanisms, and institutions through which politicians can attempt to more to an 11 indirect governing relationship;' inspectorates and the frameworks that they employ 12 in their evaluative processes act as both policy shapers and policy implementers 13 (Raffe, 2008 Power terms,' the audit explosion of the early 80's,' (Power, 1997:3) , it became 20 established as one of the core elements of evaluating with validity (House, 1980) but 21 quickly became problematized, particularly when coupled with notions of 'inspector 22 discretion:' the extent to which inspectors rely on their professional judgment and 23 discretion when making their judgements (Bardach & Kagan, 2010) . But inspector 24 discretion and the extent to which this influences the notional independence and 25 impartiality of the regulatory agency is not the only element of independence which is 26 increasingly called into question when referring to public service inspectorates. 27 Clarke breaks down this notion of independence, identifying four paradoxes inherent 28 within the term: the institutional, political, the social and the technical. What these 29 mean in terms of the agencies tasked with undertaking this regulation is illustrated in 30 
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This need for independence has according to Boyne and colleagues a dual function: 3 the first focusing on the dynamogenic affect inherent within the symbolic importance 4 of inspection and the extent to which it is able to , 'offer comfort or reassurance to a 5 range of stakeholders,' (1199); the second points to its fundamental role in a 6 successful typology of inspection methodology. It is identified by House as a core to 7 the principle of 'fairness' and the principle of evaluating with validity; again focusing 8 on the perceptual validity that has currency with government, public, profession and 9 service user (House, 1980) . But as Clarke points out, the concept of independence 10 in terms of regulation is not straightforward and any regulatory body attempting to 11 create and perpetuate a discourse of independence, needs to consider the ways in 12 which the term is constructed by both public, profession and government. 13 Independence has always been a central tenet within Ofsted discourse, their mantra 14 since inception: 'we report without fear or favour,' emphasising that Ofsted 15 judgements are both impartial and objective (Ofsted, 2012f ). This is not purely 16 reflected within its code of practice, but equally in the context of its reporting 17 structure. One lead inspector explained why because of its reporting structure, the 18 agency is independent of government and party politics: 19 The need for political distance between regulatory bodies and government appears 7 in a number of influential texts on the fundamental to successful regulation across 8 the public services but as the discussion which follows points out , the extent to 9 which Ofsted is independent has been contested since its inception in 1992. 10
Challenges to this independence have been made according to all four of the 11 paradoxes identified by Clarke. In terms of paradox one: the technical dimension, the 12 agency has experienced continual challenge to the methodologies by which it 13 reaches its judgements. These range from criticisms on an over reliance on data 14 and as a result the 'satisfactory' judgement was re-worded to 'requires improvement. ' 11 In terms of Clarke's definition of political paradox, in the eyes of both public, teaching 12 profession and press, this placed the agency in very close alignment with not only 13 government policy but in uncomfortably close proximity to right wing political 14 agendas as articulated by The Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove 15 (Abrams, 2012; Stewart, 2012) . 16 The impact of these elements also heralded challenges in terms of performance 17 paradox number three: the institutional paradox. Defined by Clarke as the extent to 18 which the regulatory agency is deemed separate from the service providers. This 19 separation between service provider and regulator is also a focus of Boyne and 20 colleagues work who, while agreeing with the Audit Commission that , 'skilled and 21 credible inspectors are the single most important feature of a successful inspection 22 service (Commission, 1999:9) 
them.' (EP10) 24
The impact of this shift is as yet unproven; although since the inception of the new 25 regime the quantity of complaints by head teachers on the inspection process has 26 risen there is little evidence as yet of the ways in which this new relationship will 27 affect both teaching policy and practices and the perception of inspection as an 28 impartial and independent act (for further discussion of the implications of this see 29 
Author, 2013b; Author & REMOVED FOR BLIND REVIEW, 2013). 30
There is little doubt that in-service inspectors will bring a different dimension to the 1 inspection process, but what this impact will be, brings us to Clarke's final regulatory 2 paradox of independence: the social paradox. This element of paradox is most 3 concerned with the ways that personal and professional identities, previous 4 experience and interests of individuals concerned reflect on the inspection process. 5
The introduction of practising head teachers from schools judged by Ofsted to be 6 either good or outstanding raises substantial issues in terms of both the experience The case study takes an idiographic approach using multiple site analysis (Stake, 3 2006 ) in which individual sites may yield insights which apply across sites but in 4 which geographical, cultural and contextual differences are acknowledged as core to 5 the research at each individual location. 6
A Responsive Framework?
7
In this section of the paper I examine the ways in which the 2012 Framework has 8 changed the way in which inspection is carried out, and examines to what extent 9 these changes both mitigate and compound the paradox of independence in 10 regulatory terms. 11
As discussed, since inception Ofsted's effectiveness has been called into question 12
by parliament, press and the public, who have questioned the extent to which its 13 judgements can be deemed to be both valid and robust (Matthews provided.' (Ofsted, 2009 (Ofsted, , 2012c . But in spite of the continual development of Ofsted frameworks for inspection, the 10 agency has often been accused of lack of flexibility and ability to react to public 11 expectations of it (Parliament, 2004 (Parliament, , 2011b . Paradoxically the changing frameworks 12 have also led to conflicting accusations from the profession who bemoan the lack of 13 consistency between frameworks and a lack of cohesion in terms of the changing 14 notions of excellence year on year, accusing the changes of being driven by party 15 political agendas rather than a real concern with school improvement (Ozga, Author, 16 ET AL REMOVED FOR BLIND REVIEW ). Changes in the frameworks also create a 17 sense what has been termed, 'performance ambiguity,' (Boyne et al., 2002 (Boyne et al., :1206 . 18 This may be due to the considerable challenge of enabling teachers and head 19 teachers to keep pace with new expectations and the thinking behind the differing 20 frameworks. A good example of this is the radical shift in the focus of teacher 21 observation within the new framework. 22
Observation of teaching has always been a feature of the English inspection system 23 (Maclure, 2000) . The agency states that,' the key objective of lesson observation is 24
to evaluate the quality of teaching and its contribution to learning' (Ofsted, 2012b) . 25 This learning is not just evaluated by what is seen in the lesson but is backed up with 26 a considerable amount of data which reflects both pupil attainment and pupil 27 achievement. The type of data used in inspections along with the extent to which it 28 drives judgements has been contested for some time now (for further discussion see 
what staff thought they might do! (EP7) 25
The same head remarked on the feedback process and its effect on staff morale: 26 In looking to create a more developmental process this emphasis on observation has 3 created considerable difficulties for inspectors, who are expected to sustain excellent 4 levels of feedback and developmental advice within a very constrained timeframe. 5
As the comments above demonstrate, in trying to overcome accusations of 6 overreliance on data, and in an attempt to foster links between school /teacher 7 improvement and inspection, the inspectorate appear to have created a new 8 paradox: one that due to exceptionally tight time frames involved in the new 9 framework the rigour and robustness of judgements on teacher performance are 10 called into question. 11
Another key challenge within the new approach is the need for the teaching 12 inspector to be able to put aside professional understandings of what constitutes 13 good teaching and concentrate upon whether this teaching effects good learning. 14 Although a full discussion of this is out of scope for this paper (see Author, 2013b Ofsted's ability to survive so far has in part been due to its capacity to reinvent itself, 19 aligning its structure and climate to the political backdrop against which it operates 20 yet creating a discourse of inspection which places the agency at a respectable 21 distance from its political masters. In order to continue to do so it may need to re-22 define its function within the current education landscape in order to prevent the 23 Janus like approach of the 2012 Framework with its fuzzy boundaries between 24 development and regulation from compromising its capacity as an instrument by 25 which to govern education in England. 26
